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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

plaintiffs.1 3 The court reasoned that subdivision 2 must either
apply to commercial actions or to all actions
wherein it is the
74
defendant who applies for the preference.
The court's decision appears to be especially sound in view
of the rationale underlying the grant of a preference in an
attachment situation. The preference is for the benefit of the
defendant so that his property is not unnecessarily encumbered
for long periods of time.
ARTICLE 50 - JUDGMENTS GENERALLY

CPLR 5001(a): Interest from time of accident denied in breach
of warranty action for personal injuries.
In Gillespie v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 7 5 the
Court of Appeals ruled on the question of whether or not interest
will be allowed from the date of injury' in personal injury actions
based on breach of warranty. Plaintiff, injured by flying glass
when a carton of quinine water exploded, contended that since
176
the action was based on "breach of performance of a contract"'
interest should be recoverable from the date of the accident.
In a previous warranty action for personal injury, Gellman
v. Hotel Corp. of America 7 interest was allowed from the
date of the accident. It was reasoned that since the action was
grounded in contract, interest should be allowed .17
Gillespie,
however, makes it clear that where the action is based on personal
injury, no interest will be allowed.
T

CPLR 5002:

Interest allowed from date of arbitration award.

By virtue of CPLR 5002, interest is recoverable upon a sum
awarded "from the date the verdict was rendered or the report
or decision was made to the date of entry of final judgment."
Until recently there has been some confusion as to whether or
not interest could be recovered on an arbitration award. Commentators have stated that since it is arguable that arbitration

56 Misc. 2d at 509, 288 N.Y.S2d at 734.
17Id.
'7521
N.Y.2d 823, 235 N.E2d 911, 288 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1968) (men.).
1
76 See CPLR 5001(a).
17746 Misc. 2d 521, 260 N.Y.S.2d 154 (Civ. Ct Bronx County 1965).
1.785 WzmsraTs
, KoRN & Mnm, NEW Yoax Civi. PR~cricE 15001.07
(1965). But see 7B McKIN NE's CPLR 5001, supp. commentary 84
(1967) (contending that although the action is nominally for breach of
17

warranty, it is in reality basically a tort action).
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awards are merely advisory until1 79confirmation, interest probably
would not run until confirmation.
In Matter of Kavares v. MVAIC, 18 0 the appellate division,
first department, held that the determination of an MVAIC
award is not merely advisory, but binding on the parties, and
absent fraud or statutory wrongdoing must be confirmed if application is made by a party within one year.' 8
The court
reasoned that since such awards were final and definite, they
would come within the purview of CPLR 5002.182
The practitioner should thus be able to obtain compensation
for his client for any delay between the time of award and
confirmation.
CPLR 5015(a):

Court may vacate a judgment it has rendered.

According to CPLR 5015 (a) a court which rendered a
judgment may relieve a party from it in the interests of justice.
A court may, thus, reverse its judgment where, for example,
there was an excusable default or where evidence,
discovered
88
after a trial, makes the result of that trial unjust.
In Brenner v. Arterial Plaz , Inc.,14 plaintiff obtained a
default judgment in New York County, and subsequently filed a
transcript of it in Fulton County. Defendant moved to have the
default vacated, laying the venue of the motion in Saratoga
County and asserting the filing in Fulton County as jurisdictional
grounds for the motion. In reversing an order which set aside
the verdict, the appellate division, third department, cited the
provisions of the CPLR requiring that a motion on notice be
heard where the action is triable, 85 i.e., "after entry of judgment,
the place where the judgment was entered."'18 The court observed
that while a judgment may be docketed many times it 87is entered
only once, i.e., where the action proceeded to judgmentY.

"7 See
5 WINSTIN, Kom & MT.Lml, NWv YoRK Civil, PRAcricE
15002.04 (1965).
18029 App. Div. 2d 68, 285 N.Y.S.2d 983 (1st Dep't 1967).
is'CPLR 7510. See also Wilkins, 169 N.Y. 494, 496-97 (1902) for the
grounds upon which an arbitration award will be set aside.
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App. Div. 2d at 71, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 987.

CPLR 5015(a)

(1)

& (2).

App. Div. 2d 815, 287 N.Y.S2d 308

(3d Dep't 1968)

(menr.).

CPLR 2212(a).

186 CPLR 105(c).
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29 App. Div. 2d 815, 816, 287 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (3d Dep't 1968)

(men.).

